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Using Treasury and Inland Revenue files from the National Archives, this article traces the 
developments leading to the introduction of the first set of UK provisions specifically designed 
to charge profits from the exercise of employee share options as income. It examines how 
the Revenue discovered a potential problem in their interpretation of existing general 
legislation and their reaction to the loss of a test case in the House of Lords. It gives an 
insight into how policy in the area was formulated and into the relationship between the 
Revenue and Treasury Ministers who, even though knowledgeable on the subject, found 
themselves persuaded to act almost completely in accordance with the Revenue's views.  
Introduction  
BEFORE the 1960s there was little use of share option schemes by UK companies for 
rewarding their employees. This was partly because the Revenue charged the excess of the 
market value over the cost of acquisition to income tax and surtax on exercise of the option. 
However in the late 1950s some taxpayers began to challenge the Revenue interpretation 
and took cases before the courts claiming that the measure of income had to be determined 
at the time the option was granted rather than at the time of its exercise. There was some 
disagreement between judges in different cases as they struggled to distinguish one fact 
pattern from another and this led to a short period of confusion until the matter was settled 
in favour of the taxpayer by the House of Lords in June 1960 in Abbott v Philbin. 1 This 
decision created potential for a considerable tax advantage in rewarding employees by the 
use of share options, particularly as there was at that time no capital gains tax when the 
shares acquired were eventually sold. Although capital gains tax was introduced in 1965, the 
differential between its maximum rate of 30 per cent and the maximum combined rate of 
income tax and surtax (91 and a quarter per cent) meant that share options were still an 
attractive proposition. Eventually, in 1966, the Revenue persuaded the Labour Government 
to reinstate the position to that which had operated prior to Abbott v Philbin. This article 
examines the 10-year build up towards this legislative action. 
*B.T.R. 118 Reports of an incipient problem  
At the beginning of 1958 the head of each specialist area within the Revenue made a report 
to the Chief Inspector of Taxes in respect of the previous year. One such report drew 
attention to the growing attraction of share option schemes in providing an inducement for 
senior executives in the form of a potential future tax-free capital gain, despite the 
immediate benefit charge arising at the point of exercise of the option. However, it also 
referred to: 
“a stiffening and increasing resistance, stimulated by the opinion of eminent counsel, to the 
official view that tax liability arises by reference to the value of the shares at the date a share 
option is exercised.”2  
The report also indicated that some cases had been referred to the Board's Solicitor to defend 
assessments based on the Revenue's view and that an impending case before the Court of 
Session would soon provide guidance on the issue. A few days later in Forbes's Executors v 
CIR 3 all three judges concluded that the Revenue's interpretation was correct. 
The problem grows  
Despite the Revenue's success in Forbes's Executors, the report of the Revenue's specialist 
for 1958 indicated that agents were still ready to assert that the case was of limited 
application (but gives no reason why this is so).4 The decision was not followed by the 
General Commissioners in a subsequent case where, on the facts, they decided that the 
income arose when the option was granted. Although the report indicated that the Revenue 
were prepared to appeal, they chose to rely instead on Abbott v Philbin which came before 
the Special Commissioners in February 1958.5 Giving their decision in early April that year, 
they concluded that the Forbes case was binding upon them and that the facts were 
indistinguishable, despite Forbes being given his option while Abbott was required to pay a 
small sum for its grant. However, in March of the following year Abbott won his appeal as the 
High Court decided that payment for the grant of the option enabled his case to be 
distinguished. By October 1959 the Crown had obtained a unanimous decision of the Court of 
Appeal that the principles in Forbes applied to Abbott as the two cases were indistinguishable. 
However, in June 1960 the House of Lords decided on a 3:2 majority to overrule the Forbes 
case and concluded that the only benefit which could arise was at the time the option was 
granted. Thus, any increase in value of an option between grant and exercise was a capital 
profit derived from that asset and not from services; so the profit was not liable to income 
tax whether the grant was gratuitous or not. As a result, the uncertainty surrounding the tax 
treatment of employee share options (following eminent counsel's opinion contrary to the 
then Revenue practice) was removed. The driving force for a great increase in companies 
using options over their shares to reward employees had been created. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the Revenue saw an immediate increase in the number of companies granting 
share options following the House of Lords decision.6  
*B.T.R. 119 A proposed legislative solution  
It appears that immediately after their final defeat in Abbott v Philbin, the Revenue decided 
not to press for corrective legislation as there was insufficient tax at stake.7 The specialists' 
reports to the Chief Inspector make no further mention of the matter. There is no evidence of 
any attempt to have the law altered until a Labour Government was installed in October 1964 
and the Chancellor (James Callaghan) asked for a note about possible anti-avoidance 
measures for the forthcoming Finance Bill. The Revenue suggested four topics for 
consideration: a general anti-avoidance measure; covenanted transfers of income; business 
expenses; and share options.8 This was followed up by a detailed memorandum for the 
Chancellor copied to both the Chief Secretary and the Financial Secretary to the Treasury. It 
explained the history of the Revenue treatment of share options, the position following the 
final decision in Abbott v Philbin and the fact that they “only rarely succeeded in establishing 
that such options have more than a nominal value.”9 It pointed out that “the option… gives 
the taxpayer the right to take advantage of a rise on the cheap, without exposing him to the 
risk of a fall.”10 In the previous four years, the Revenue had found that well over 100 
companies had granted options to directors and employees and expected there to be more 
which had yet to be reported to them. They argued that, although at that time there was not 
a great amount of tax at stake, the ultimate tax-free gains would often be very substantial 
and would be subject to much adverse public comment. Accordingly, it was urged that action 
be taken sooner rather than later. 
Having explained the nature of the problem, the memorandum turned to the implications of 
restoring the position to that which had existed before the House of Lords judgment and 
warned that the legislation would have to be “somewhat complex to stop all possible ways of 
getting round the charge.”11 It also warned of arguments from some quarters that the 
increase in value between grant and exercise should only be liable to capital gains tax--the 
introduction of which had already been decided. The contrary argument was felt to be 
stronger in that those supporting the use of options did so “on the grounds that they 
provided an incentive to those who received them” and that to tax any gain as emoluments 
“would, we think, reflect more accurately the truth of the matter.”12  
The memorandum moved on to the tricky question of whether the new legislation should only 
apply to options granted after it was introduced or to all options exercised, no matter when 
the option was granted. As the Revenue had seen many options granted for a 10-year period, 
and some for even longer, they thought it unjustifiable to exclude these merely on the 
grounds that they were granted prior to 1965/66 and again argued that on taking up the 
shares an employee was actually receiving remuneration. They believed that taking such an 
approach was not truly retrospective because “the granting of the option merely set the stage 
for the avoidance”.13  
After a brief diversion into the merits or otherwise of share options for the company and its 
shareholders and the potential for conflicts of interest that they created, the *B.T.R. 120 
memorandum turned to international comparisons. Canada and West Germany already 
operated a scheme similar to that which the Revenue were proposing and in the United 
States a similar position applied unless the shares acquired were held for at least three years 
and certain other conditions were met, in which case the profit was taxable as a capital gain. 
The United Kingdom was therefore said to be out of line with other industrial countries. 
Ministerial reaction  
The Chief Secretary to the Treasury (John Diamond, a chartered accountant) took the lead in 
responding to the Revenue's memorandum. Although accepting the tax avoidance aspect of 
options, he rejected taking any action on four grounds: 
1) the existing position was covered in a House of Lords judgment; 
2) retrospection would create difficulties not worth facing on a minor issue; 
3) the growth in value between grant and exercise was capital not income; and 
4) the benefit to the option-holder caused a corresponding loss to other shareholders which 
was not an allowable deduction for income tax purposes. 
He recommended to the Chancellor that no action be taken as the existing short-term gains 
tax and the proposed capital gains tax would satisfy all the Revenue's arguments and avoid 
all the difficulties.14  
However, the Revenue were not prepared to give up and rebutted each of his objections. 
First, they suggested that it was not uncommon for defects in the law to be revealed by 
decisions of the courts and that these were quite frequently dealt with by corrective 
legislation. Rather perversely, they then stated that on a count of heads in all three courts 
the majority favoured the Revenue's view. As regards retrospection, they argued that there 
was none “in the full sense, i.e. changing the law for transactions already carried out”15 and 
warned that to allow options granted before Budget day to escape would be regarded in some 
quarters as over-generous. As regards growth in value being a capital matter, their view was 
that there was no reason why the provision of actual shares at an undervalue should be 
taxable as income whereas the growth in value between grant and exercise of an option over 
those shares should only be liable to capital gains tax on the subsequent disposal of the 
shares, possibly many years later. Finally, the Revenue could see no grounds for other 
shareholders getting any corresponding relief for reductions in value of their shares as this 
related to their capital. 
Mr Diamond responded by politely but robustly rejecting each of the first three Revenue 
rebuttals and ignoring the last one. After dismissing the head count argument as irrelevant, 
he went on to disagree that full retrospection was not involved in the Revenue's proposals. 
Although not wholly against retrospection, he thought: 
“that politically speaking a Labour Government has to be even more careful than a 
Conservative one on this issue: rightly or wrongly an unsatisfactory image has been created 
in this respect”.16  
*B.T.R. 121 He did, however, agree that it would be over-generous to allow all options 
granted before Budget day to escape liability. It is quite clear that Mr Diamond thoroughly 
understood how share options operated and was not going to be fobbed off by the Revenue's 
comparison between shares issued cheaply and the grant of an option and took issue with 
their statement that the option gave the right “to take up the shares cheap at a future 
date”.17 As he rightly pointed out, the price may or may not be cheap and there is no exact 
parallel between the issue of shares and the grant of an option over shares. 
The Chief Secretary made it clear to the Revenue that he regarded a share option as an asset 
which should be liable to capital gains tax on the difference between the market value of the 
shares acquired on exercise and the total cost of acquiring them and that this should be 
charged on exercise with further capital gains tax payable on the eventual disposal of those 
shares. By this means, combined with any existing options being revalued on Budget day, he 
believed his proposals would meet with little resistance. 
Feeling as though they were being pushed towards a capital gains solution, the Revenue 
responded that they wished to examine in greater detail “why the United States (which have 
of course great experience in share options) have felt obliged to tighten up on the capital 
gains treatment of options”.18 Although ostensibly they had the relevant US material in their 
office, unusually for them, it took just over two weeks to get back to Mr Diamond. 
The Chancellor's only input at this stage was to request an explanation of how share options 
worked and clarification of when any gain was obtained.19 This enabled the Revenue to give 
him a very straightforward and brief account of the tax-free benefit employees were 
obtaining and to emphasise that this was at variance with the general principle that where an 
employee obtained something saleable from his employer at less than market price the 
difference was pay even though no cash was received.20  
The only contribution to the debate by the Financial Secretary (Niall MacDermot QC) was to 
support Mr Diamond's view that the legislation should not reverse the effect of Abbott v 
Philbin and that the increase in value of options should only be charged to capital gains tax or 
short-term gains tax.21 At this stage it therefore looked very much as if the Revenue were not 
going to get their way. However, they still had not apprised ministers of the United States' 
experience of taxing share options. 
Clinching the argument  
Given the difficulty in persuading the Revenue to agree with his views, it is not surprising that 
Mr Diamond suggested a round table discussion to resolve matters. Prior to that meeting the 
Revenue submitted an eight page memorandum which, besides quibbling over Mr Diamond's 
earlier arguments, raised many new and persuasive matters to consider.22 First, they pointed 
out that their practice prior to the decision in Abbott v Philbin had not created any significant 
problems. Secondly, they suggested that industrial opinion was *B.T.R. 122 deeply divided 
on the desirability of providing share options to directors and employees. Thirdly, it was 
submitted that in the context of an incomes policy: 
“this is one of these perquisites given to the higher salaried staff that can cause irritation 
lower down … [and] many of the best industrialists dislike the practice on other grounds as 
well”.23  
Their final, and perhaps most persuasive, new argument concerned the situation in the 
United States where in 1950 a special relieving provision had been introduced to charge 
profits on share options as capital gains if certain conditions were satisfied, so overturning 
their prior treatment as income. According to the Revenue, this had led to such an enormous 
increase in the granting of employee share options that in 1963 the President's tax message 
to Congress proposed the withdrawal of capital gains treatment. The content of the 
President's message must have created concern in the minds of Labour ministers. It pointed 
out that two out of three corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange had option 
plans and that the benefits, measured by the spread between the exercise price and the 
market price, often far exceeded any other part of the executive compensation. Three 
hundred and fifty large companies had provided their executives with option benefits totalling 
$200 million in 1959, $164 million in 1960, and even more in 1961 as a result of the marked 
rise in stock prices that year. The President's main arguments for eliminating preferential 
treatment are set out below: 
-- stock options were a reward for services so paying tax at capital gains rates was 
inconsistent with accepted principles of tax fairness; 
-- a contemporary study of 166 top executives in 31 of the 50 largest industrial corporations 
had shown average option benefits of $83,000 a year, with almost 40 per cent of them 
having after-tax benefits exceeding their after-tax salaries and bonuses; 
-- some individuals had option benefits of millions of dollars; 
-- treatment of stock option profits as capital gains was based on the belief that they would 
provide an incentive to recruit and retain executives and stimulate them to greater effort but 
“the advantages claimed do not appear to be substantiated by experience”24 ; 
-- the evidence suggested that options were used almost entirely to reward present 
management rather than to attract new executives and that they often tended to impede 
rather than to improve executive mobility as they were set up in a manner to tie executives 
to their present jobs; 
-- in many cases, the executives already had such large shareholdings in the company that 
further incentives were almost irrelevant; 
-- Treasury studies had shown that about two thirds of the employees exercising their options 
disposed of all or part of the shares within three years and this was inconsistent with the 
objective of creating a proprietary interest in the business for executives; 
*B.T.R. 123 -- the awards conferred were more related to changes in investor outlook and 
stock prices generally than to the efforts of executives. 
Despite the above-mentioned arguments and the President's recommendation that profits on 
share options should be charged at ordinary income tax rates, he only succeeded in getting 
more stringent conditions for option gains to qualify as capital gains, i.e. the exercise price 
had to be no less than the share price at the time of grant; the exercise period could not 
exceed five years; the shares acquired would have to be held for at least three years; and 
the individual could not hold more than five per cent of the ordinary stock. As the Revenue 
pointed out, many existing UK options would not have qualified for capital gains treatment 
under the above rules. 
Clearly, some of the practices which had developed in the United States, and the President's 
difficulty in removing capital gains treatment, must have had a severe impact on ministerial 
thinking. The Revenue forced home the point by arguing that although granting options: 
“has not so far spread here to anything like the extent that it has in the USA, the American 
experience is, however, some indication of how things can develop where option profits are 
taxed as capital gains”.25  
It is suggested that other matters raised by the Revenue, including the need for special 
capital gains legislation to achieve Mr Diamond's preferred approach, were relatively trivial in 
comparison to the impact of the detailed description of the US experience of taxing option 
profits as capital gains. Perhaps it is not surprising therefore that at the subsequent meeting 
with the Chief Secretary and the Financial Secretary it was agreed that the Revenue's 
approach was the right one. Thus, there was to be a Schedule E charge on the exercise of an 
option but limited for existing options to the increase in value between Budget day and the 
exercise. The latter point had been forced on the Revenue to minimise any criticism on the 
score of retrospection. 
All that was left to do was to obtain agreement from the Chancellor. In a brief note the 
Revenue informed him that a clause had already been drafted and that with little additional 
work it could be included in the Finance Bill and “would probably make some appeal to the 
unions in connection with an incomes policy”.26 Although the Revenue made it clear that this 
matter was less important than dealing with business expenses and deeds of covenant, the 
Chancellor had already decided that share options had to be left to next year “purely [as] a 
matter of lack of legislative time [as] the Lord President and PM are already pressing me 
about the length of the Finance Bill”.27  
A second and successful attempt  
In late December 1965, the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue wrote to the Chancellor 
about the agreed proposals deferred from the previous Finance Bill and set out a broad 
outline of the arguments which had been rehearsed previously. He warned that “the longer 
legislation is deferred the more difficult it will be to tackle this avoidance *B.T.R. 124 
device”28 and reminded him that the United Kingdom was out of line with most other 
industrial nations. The difficulties faced in the United States were also resurrected. The 
Revenue had been keeping an eye on the growth in companies using option schemes and 
advised that they had not only discovered almost 60 new cases in the previous 12 months 
but were also aware that many more companies were thinking of introducing them. They 
warned that such schemes would soon become an accepted feature of executive 
remuneration, as they already were in the United States, with the potential for substantial 
profit which would inevitably be the subject of much adverse public comment. As the length 
of the previous Finance Bill had been the stumbling block for earlier action, the Revenue 
concluded their submission by stating that the matter could be dealt with in one clause in just 
over two pages, even though it would be “somewhat complex to stop all possible ways of 
getting round the charge”.29 The Chancellor agreed that legislation should be introduced in 
the 1966 Finance Bill but only if there was room. Nevertheless, he requested that the 
necessary work be put in hand.30  
The Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue became aware from a conversation with the 
Permanent Secretary of the Board of Trade (Sir Richard Powell) that that department looked 
upon the use of share options in a fairly benevolent way. He therefore wrote to the 
Chancellor with a draft letter for him to send to the President of the Board of Trade to ensure 
there would be no disagreement between them concerning the need to introduce the tax 
provisions and to emphasise that the United Kingdom was out of line with other industrialised 
countries. The tone of the letter is reflected in the following extract: 
“…industrialists are very divided in their views about share options. I am clear that, from our 
point of view, they are just one of those undesirable efforts to escape the taxes that other 
people must pay and that we ought to grasp the nettle now. The ordinary worker… is rightly 
irritated at the sight of executives getting the benefit of tax fiddles. This is a good time to act, 
as the values of many shares are stagnant and options are not a great attraction at present. 
Nevertheless a number of firms are toying with them and we ought to act before any growth 
that makes action difficult.”31  
The President of the Board of Trade agreed to support the Chancellor's action and the 
possibility of disagreement between the two departments was thus successfully averted. 
Closing a potential loophole  
Following publication of the Finance Bill there was comment in the press, including The 
Economist and the Financial Times, indicating that the clause could be circumvented by 
granting options in an investment company which held shares in the employing company or 
group, provided it was not controlled by that company or group. Although the Revenue had 
not come across options of this kind, they thought such arrangements were possible and so 
wrote to the Chancellor suggesting that: 
*B.T.R. 125 “it would be foolish to leave open [this] opportunity … and it would be easy to … 
catch options of this kind…by making the clause apply to the grant of options on the shares of 
any company”.32  
Although this would cast the net very wide, they could find no alternative which would catch 
all possible variants of the device. Having pointed out that the necessary amendment would 
be simple and would reduce the length of the clause, the Revenue probably expected 
straight-forward agreement. However, there was to be none. 
The Chief Secretary thought that the amendment was unnecessary and could not imagine 
circumstances where a company would be in a position to grant options over another's shares 
and the Chancellor agreed with him. The Revenue were not prepared to give up and quickly 
responded by setting out three methods by which avoidance experts might contrive to 
sidestep the clause, two of which had appeared in The Economist of May 21, 1966. The first 
was “by putting an investment trust under the control of trustees who were formally, at any 
rate, independent of the company”.33 Secondly, a merchant bank might set up and own 
shares in an investment trust company which itself held shares in a few companies which had 
provided low interest loans to the investment trust. Options would then be granted to 
executives to buy shares at a discount in their employing companies held by the trust. A third 
method was a variation of the second and involved unrelated companies co-operating in 
setting up an investment trust with options being granted over its shares. 
Despite stressing the fact that as these possibilities had been drawn to the attention of the 
public by the press and that it would be unwise to assume they would not be exploited, the 
Chief Secretary still resisted. He believed: 
“that we would run the risk of creating an unfortunate image if we keep on having second 
thoughts about our own proposals before they have even been debated or enacted”.34  
He suggested two possible ways forward. First, was the rather impractical suggestion of 
awaiting the Committee Stage debates and, if an acceptable amendment was put forward, to 
incorporate the anti-avoidance alteration. Alternatively, “we could give warning of possible 
future retrospective legislation à la dividend-stripping warning, and leave it at that”.35  
On the question of image, the Revenue accepted the point but suggested that, as these ideas 
had already been put forward “in responsible quarters as a serious proposition”, there was a 
convincing excuse for reinforcing the defences of the clause. 
“We have bitter experience over many years to show that avoidance experts are ready to 
exploit any gap, no matter how unusual; and we think that Ministers may well be sharply 
criticised if they close their eyes to one which has been widely advertised.”36  
As regards waiting for a related acceptable amendment, the Revenue thought it unlikely that 
there would be one to which an anti-avoidance change could be linked. The threat *B.T.R. 
126 of retrospective legislation was also given short shrift. They argued that, although this 
method had been used to discourage devious and unforeseen ways around anti-avoidance 
provisions, it would be difficult to justify relying on such a warning on a matter which had 
been clearly described and could easily be met by an amendment to the current clause. 
Once he had seen the initial memorandum from the Revenue and the rejection of acting upon 
it by the Chief Secretary and the Chancellor, the Financial Secretary wrote to urge them to 
reconsider the matter as “we will look foolish if we fail to plug a hole to which attention has 
already been drawn in the press”.37 This broke the deadlock. The three Ministers met to 
discuss the matter and agreed the Revenue's recommendation for a government 
amendment.38 This episode seems to show how some Ministers were imagining difficulties 
where none existed and were dithering when the appropriate decision was obvious. In this 
case the civil servants were instrumental in protecting Ministers from adverse publicity. It is 
suggested that it should have been clear to the Chancellor that he was being provided with 
an opportunity to show himself to be well informed, proactive in blocking all loopholes and 
determined to attack the creators of tax avoidance schemes. 
Parliamentary opposition  
As a result of the general election in March 1966, the Budget Statement was delayed until 
May 3 and it only included a brief statement on the proposals for taxing share options.39 
There was no discussion of the matter in the Budget debates but four categories of 
Opposition amendment were put forward at the committee stage. First, to deal with supposed 
retrospective elements; secondly, to charge only capital gains tax; thirdly, to spread the tax 
charge over a number of years; and finally, to provide a let-out for option schemes applying 
to all a company's employees. The only government amendment was that referred to above, 
which extended the provisions to options granted in a company other than the employer, and 
this met with little resistance. 
Although the clause excluded from charge any increase in value arising prior to Budget Day, 
the Opposition wanted all existing options excluded from any charge on the basis that to do 
otherwise was retrospectively interfering with an existing contract. Ministers dismissed this as 
a complete fallacy on the grounds that there was no amendment of the law applicable to 
events which had already taken place and no imposition of tax on completed transactions 
which were not taxable at that time. The position was said to be exactly comparable to what 
the Conservative Government had done in the Finance Act 1960 to restore the longstanding 
practice in connection with post-cessation receipts which had been found to be incorrect by 
the House of Lords. Furthermore, it was pointed out that there had been widespread 
speculation in the press on the question of how long it would be before the Abbott v Philbin 
position would be reversed. It was also argued that there were two distinct potential 
elements of profit, one on grant and one on exercise, so that the provision was not 
retrospective but was merely disappointing expectations of an exemption from future tax 
liabilities at the time of exercise. After much fruitless argument, the amendment was 
rejected.40  
*B.T.R. 127 Given that the top rate of income tax was 91 and a quarter per cent, not 
surprisingly there was an attempt to water down the proposals so that only capital gains tax, 
with a maximum rate of 30 per cent, was chargeable. The supporting arguments were based 
upon the supposed disincentive on top executives, the improved profitability of companies 
with such schemes, and options being an efficient means for the capitalist to transfer some of 
his assets to managers. All of this was dismissed on the grounds that options were merely a 
reward for services and were regarded as such by the company, just like a cash bonus or like 
shares themselves being allotted to employees at an undervalue.41  
The amendments concerning spreading the tax charge involved two possible approaches: 
either spreading equally over the years from grant to exercise or spreading over the year of 
exercise and the following two tax years, in a manner similar to that which already applied to 
inventors and authors. Ministers could see no merit in either approach because, where shares 
themselves were given (instead of options) as a reward for many years of service, the benefit 
would nevertheless be wholly taxable in one year and, in any event, the option-holder could 
usually spread the exercise of his option and the resultant tax liability over a number of 
years. The spectre of bright young managers joining the “brain drain” to America was also 
brought up. This argument was repelled by quoting passages on the lack of evidence for 
share options improving recruitment and retention from President Kennedy's tax message to 
Congress referred to above.42  
The proposal for a let-out for all-employee schemes was put forward by the Liberals who, 
though supporting the Government on the clause, wished to encourage what they described 
as industrial co-ownership and partnership schemes. Their aim was to create a greater 
employee interest in the fortunes of their employing companies in order to create a less 
confrontational manner of conducting industrial relations. The Financial Secretary resisted 
this proposal on the grounds that the Revenue had no knowledge of any such scheme being 
operated and that it would therefore be inappropriate to grant a special tax benefit in 
advance of anyone working out all its technicalities. More importantly, he could see no reason 
why employees of companies should be able to benefit while other workers would not, as this 
would depart from the principle that all forms of income should be liable to income tax 
whatever their source.43  
Conclusion  
Although it was an arduous process, the Revenue achieved almost exactly what they had set 
out to obtain. In order to do this, they showed extremely skilful management of ministers by 
taking account of their wider political and economic concerns. The Chancellor apparently had 
little understanding of share options and was fortunate to be able to leave matters in the 
hands of his two assistants, an accountant and a lawyer, both of whom had an in-depth 
knowledge of the relevant issues, and both of whom initially rejected most of the Revenue's 
advice. However, the Revenue persisted in pressing their views, and eventually achieved a 
breakthrough by intelligent use of evidence of public opinion gleaned from reports in the city 
pages of the newspapers and specialist financial magazines. Additionally, the ability to make 
international comparisons and access the *B.T.R. 128 practical experience of overseas tax 
authorities on similar issues was crucial to their success. 
By the time the clause came to be debated in Parliament, ministers were therefore well 
versed in all the nuances of the subject as well as its fundamental policy objectives and this 
enabled them to deal easily with all Opposition objections, so that no changes were made. 
The resultant legislation remained virtually unaltered until major reconstruction of the 
legislation on employment-related securities took place in 2003. Even then, its fundamental 
principle (of making no tax charge on grant of an option but only on its exercise) and its 
approach to determining chargeable events and taxable amounts all survived this 
reconstruction. The fact that the old rules are at the heart of the new legislation on options44 
is clear evidence of the success of the original provisions. 
The Revenue's earlier fears of a rapid growth in the use of option schemes were soon allayed 
as they found a dearth of new schemes being launched in the few years after 1966 and 
discovered that some were even cancelled. Without the tax advantage, it seems that industry 
and commerce were no longer so convinced of the motivational effects of such schemes. 
However, the Revenue's success was something of a Pyrrhic victory. Just over three years 
later, they had to return to the Chancellor to explain that a new version of the problem had 
emerged in the form of executive share incentive schemes.45 This time, ministers could not 
be persuaded to act. 
Finally, it is interesting to contrast the relatively slow process of dealing with the loss of 
Abbott v Philbin in 1960 with the current speed of HMRC reaction when case law overturns a 
widely-held view and goes against their interests. Furthermore, the length of the Finance Bill 
1965 would nowadays be considered short and so would not, as it did then, create any 
excuse for delaying an anti-avoidance provision.46  
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